Securitization or Risk Management after the Arab Uprisings? The Euro-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings

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Securitization or Risk Management after the Arab Uprisings? The Euro-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings

Prisca Jöst

Abstract

Different scholars of International Security Studies (ISS) describe the European migration policy as a securitization process. In contrast, this paper argues that the EU-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships that have been established with Morocco and Tunisia in 2013 and 2014 cannot be understood as an “extraordinary measure” in terms of the Copenhagen School. Instead, these partnerships demonstrate an ordinary European policy-making process dealing with migration to Europe. Following the argumentation of the scholars of the Paris School, the author shows that migration after the Arab uprisings has been interpreted as a risk to the European societies and national welfare systems. Due to this risk perception, the issue was managed by security professionals being responsible for the European Union’s “security management.”

Keywords: Securitization, Paris School, International Security Studies, EU Migration Policy, EU-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships

Introduction

In response to the first protests in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 and 2011, the European Union launched a new policy approach that mainly focused on democratization in the Middle East (Tömmel 2013: 24). The first proposal was already presented in March 2011 and after the fall of the Mubarak regime. In May 2011, the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy released a communication entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy” (Tömmel 2013: 25-27). This title already suggests a change of previous policies in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Thus, the Arab Uprisings were perceived as an opportunity to review the European foreign policy towards the Middle East (Asseburg 2013: 57). However, the established policies were retained and complemented by strengthening the external
borders (Fargues & Fandrich 2012: 5; Asseburg 2013: 57; Bicchi 2014: 319). This process went hand in hand with old threat perceptions of migrant flows coming to Europe, which started to influence the public debate right after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings (Asseburg 2013: 58).

This further externalization of the European Union’s migration policy in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, which includes a stronger cooperation with third countries, becomes apparent when looking at the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) that was launched in 2011 (Geddes 2014: 148). According to Andrew Geddes (2014: 153), Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich (2012: 6), one of the EU’s main interests was to create readmission agreements with its southern neighboring countries in the context of the changing political situation in the Middle East in 2011. Thus, mobility partnerships with a focus on readmission became one of the most important political tools of the common European neighborhood policy as part of the new EU “global approach” (Angenendt 2014: 9; Geddes 2014: 150). The first mobility partnership was established with Morocco in June 2013, a second one entered into force with Tunisia in March 2014 (Seeberg 2014a: 2). However, when looking at the EU’s policy towards Middle Eastern countries after the Arab Uprisings, the question arises why it has not changed in fundamental ways. In order to understand the lack of new policy approaches, it is useful to look at the whole policy-making process from a theoretical perspective: How can the EU’s continuance of its old foreign policy approach be explained theoretically after the Arab Uprisings?

In the following, I argue that the main difference can be found in the interpretation of migration in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings as a danger or as a risk for the European society, as among others Geddes (2014: 145) states. Following Geddes (2014: 145), I argue that mobility partnerships are the result of classifying migration as a security threat or as a risk. Therefore, I compare the main arguments of Copenhagen School’s securitization approach with those of the Paris School.

The following article is divided into five sections, in which I rely on empirical evidence, particularly on official documents on the EU policy towards the Mediterranean states. In the first two sections, I present the core assumptions of the Copenhagen and the Paris School. On the basis of each theoretical section, I formulate hypotheses explaining the emergence of the EU-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships from the Copenhagen and Paris School’s perspective. Section III provides evidence on the EU-Mediterranean policy in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, analyzing the emergence of the Mobility partnerships that were established with Morocco and Tunisia. Sec-

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1 According to the European Commission, GAMM is meant to create an “overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy” (European Commission 2017: n.p.), by fostering bilateral cooperation, most importantly mobility partnerships, with the southern and eastern neighbourhood of the EU. For further information on GAMM see: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en [06/02/2017].
IV finally discusses the Mobility partnerships as a result of successful securitization of risk management after the Arab uprisings. Thereby, I test both hypotheses, which have been derived from the theoretical assumptions presented in Section I and II. Thereby, I want to give an answer to the research question presented above. Section V draws final conclusions of my research and identifies starting points for further research on the topic at hand.

The Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach

The Copenhagen School² of International Security Studies was founded by its main representatives Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan who worked on issues of European security and Regional Security Complexes at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Buzan & Hansen 2009: 212; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 75). The most influential contribution to International Security Studies is the concept of securitization that was first developed by Wæver in his article “Securitization and Desecuritization” in 1995 (Buzan & Hansen 2009: 212; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76), where he describes security as a "speech act" (Wæver 1995: 55). The main arguments of the securitization approach were further developed by Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in their book „Security. A new framework for analysis“ (1998), which has become the main work of the Copenhagen School. Herein, the authors use a wider notion of security as a basis for their securitization approach. According to a traditional military understanding of security, the state – or more ideologically the nation – represents the so called referent object (Buzan et al. 1998: 22; Buzan & Hansen 2009: 213). Contrary to this traditional military understanding, environmental, economic, societal, and political issues can also become a security threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 7). This wider notion of security implies that everything can be framed as a security threat or a danger (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). Buzan et al. (1998: 5) note that the actor who can define a security threat is a so called “securitizing actor” who needs to present an existential threat to a referent object. The authors call this “act of saying security in relation to an issue” a securitizing speech act (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76). Thus, the securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential threat to legitimize extraordinary measures that decrease the identified threat. The authors of the Copenhagen School name “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups” as the most common securitizing actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 40; Buzan & Hansen 2009: 214). These actors do not refer to their own security, but instead address the security of a certain collective, as for example the state, which represents a referent object in this context. Buzan et al. (1998:

² According to Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 75) the term Copenhagen School was first used in a critique of the work of these authors.
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24) define the action of presenting an issue as a threat to a referent object by a securitizing actor a “securitizing move.” The third player in the securitization theory is the target audience. The fact that securitizing actors define an issue as a danger does not yet constitute securitization, but the relevant audience has to accept the problem as a security threat that has to be tackled with extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). According to this theoretical assumption, the “special nature of security threats” justifies the use of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). The securitizing actor claims “a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” because the survival of the referent object is at stake (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). In sum, “securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful)” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Thus, form a Copenhagen School’s perspective, mobility partnerships as new a tool of EU migration policy result from a successful securitization of migration after the Arab uprisings. Therefore, in my first hypothesis, I argue: If the EU establishes mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia, then they represent extraordinary means to target migration after the Arab uprisings.

The Paris School’s Critique of the Securitization Approach

In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School and Didier Bigo as their most prominent representative argue that it is insufficient to concentrate on the speech act to completely explain the process of securitization: „To just focus on the speech act would underestimate the bureaucratic professionalization of the management of unease.” (Bigo 2002: 74) Therefore, scholars of the Paris School focus mainly on the so called security practices (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 69). As a consequence, Bigo analyzes the whole range of security practices such as “the role of security professionals, the conduct of policing and the activities of private security companies” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 69).

In his paper “Security and Immigration” he questions why the concept of securitization remains powerful, although alternative concepts emerged (Bigo 2002: 65). In the field of migration, it means that the securitization continues despite the fact that critical discourse has already begun (Bigo 2002: 64). This “security prism” is, according to Bigo, “the result of a continuum of threats and unease in which many actors exchange their fears” and it speeds up the process of creating a “risk society” (Bigo 2002: 63). According to Bigo, the management of risk and unease legitimates decisions of security professionals, which are always related to their special interests of transforming surveillance and control technologies (2002: 64).
Therefore, he argues that ‘the politics of exception’ is replaced by the ‘management of unease’ (Bigo 2002: 64). Professionals who manage this unease are private corporations, military or intelligence services. These security professionals define risks or threats for the society:

“The dialectical relationship between political professionals and the professional managers of unease implies that the institutions working on unease not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a threat or a risk.” (Bigo 2002: 74)

Through the management of risk, security professionals claim to uncover potential threats to society even before they actually occurred. Here, they benefit from the fact that they possess authority whereas amateurs always need to defend their assertions (Bigo 2002: 66, 74). Thus, risk management is meant to uncover potential threats to society even before they occur.

Bigo criticizes that security is not an exceptional issue, as the Copenhagen School claims, but it is rather the result of the transformation of security technologies (2002: 65). Bigo further describes the feeling of unease as part of the “risk society” and thus a structural phenomenon (2002: 65). The phenomenon of immigration correlates with the fear of security professionals to lose control over territorial boundaries and, thus, to lose the legitimacy of their political power (Bigo 2002: 65). Accordingly, it is not relevant if the professionals personally think that something constitutes a risk or not, but they simply “cannot call into question those myths about state, about the integrity of the people, because the myths are the way they frame their everyday explanation of the political and social world and the way they see their own struggles and values” (Bigo 2002: 69).

Based on a specific habitus, the managers of unease constitute their own social group, which is organized on a transnational level:

“This internationalization is especially important for the European Union, where the professional managers of unease have created their own networks, sometimes against their national politicians [...].” (Bigo 2002: 75)

Therefore, simply focusing on the speech act would mean to ignore the degree of bureaucratic organization of the management of unease. Through

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3 Bigo refers to the concept of a risk society first established by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. In his work on the risk society (first published in German 1986), Beck speaks of a shift from the industrial society to a risk society (1986: 146). As part of an increasing individualization, risks become a problem that concerns everyone – independent of people’s social class. By “risks” Beck means everyday threats like the risk to become redundant or the constructed threat of migration flows coming to Europe.

4 Bigo is adopting the concept of habitus and field from the French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Habitus means the set of conscious and unconscious attitudes of people belonging to different social classes. The field is the social universe that relates different actors to each other (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 69).
their professional networks, they are able to foster the political and social system, that is based on the differentiation between internal and external threats. Bigo notes that migration is “par excellence” the object of securitization because it threatens the external borders which constitute the territorial state as well as the internal constitution of the society (2002: 77). In his opinion, this is a precondition for successful securitization. In terms of the Paris School, the EU mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia would have been established with or without the Arab uprisings since they are the outcome of the management of unease. Defined as a risk that needs to be managed by the security professionals, the topic of migration from North Africa serves to strengthen “fortress Europe.” In my second hypothesis, I argue from a Paris School perspective: If the EU mobility partnerships result from risk management in the society of unease, this targets the strengthening of the existing territorial boundaries of the EU.

**EU-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships**

In recent political science research, migration was mostly analyzed with securitization theory. For example, Jef Huysmans (2000) traces how migration became securitized in Europe. According to Huysmans (2000: 752), the development of a common migration policy in the European Union was framed to counter a danger for European societies. In this context, migration was securitized in order to strengthen external border controls.

During the last decade, the European Union developed the Justice and Home Affairs policy (JHA) with the aim to create an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (Carrera et al. 2012: 4). The starting point for the creation of the JHA was an observed increase in internationally organized crime, human trafficking, and illegal migration observed after the Cold War (Civitas 2012). In particular, this plan included the fight against illegal migration and internationally organized crime through intergovernmental cooperation between the member states and the supranational institutions of the European Union (Civitas 2012). Looking at the EU-Mediterranean relations, Tömmel (2013: 21-22) identifies a turning point in EU politics after the Cold War with a focus on a secure neighborhood under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

By passing the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European Council became responsible for the JHA and the asylum and migration policy became a concern of common interest. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European council received full control over the asylum and immigration policy as part of the JHA (Civitas 2012). According to Carrera et al. (2012: 4) this marked the beginning of the “emergence of the external dimension” concerning European integration.

In 2005, the Council of the European Union launched the so called Global Approach on Migration (GAM). GAM was the attempt to create a framework for a common migration policy among the member states of the European
Union (Angenendt 2014: 4). According to Steffen Angenendt (2014: 4), the aim was to reduce irregular migration and to improve the situation for refugees who landed in the European Union. With the aim of “strengthening freedom, security and justice” (Council of the EU 2004), the Council of the European Union released a first five-year plan called “Hague Program” in 2005, followed by the Stockholm Program in 2010.

After the GAM, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) was implemented in 2011. This new extended version of the European framework for global migration includes development aspects into the migration policy of the European Union (Angenendt 2014: 4). Angenendt mentions four areas of support which were created by GAMM: Management of legal migration, reduction of irregular migration, strengthening of the migration-development nexus, and support of the international system of refugee protection. Furthermore, the GAMM set up mobility partnerships with selected neighboring countries and common agendas on migration and mobility with those countries which are not part of a mobility partnership with the European Union (Seeberg 2013: 162). Carrera et al. (2012: 3) and Geddes (2014: 148) interpret the GAMM and especially the mobility partnerships with third countries as an attempt to strengthen the EU’s external migration policy. Mobility partnerships are meant to be the “principle instruments for further cooperation” (Carrera et al. 2012: 3) and “the most innovative and sophisticated tool of the global approach” (Angenendt 2014: 4). Geddes (2014: 148) criticizes the “blurring of the distinction between internal and external security”, now labeled as a global approach to migration. However, the most important feature of the new global approach was the implementation of readmission agreements:

“This issue of readmission has been right at the top of the EU agenda and has been linked to mobility within mobility partnerships – i.e., a clear link between migration as danger and migration as risk within the EU approach.” (Geddes 2014: 153)

Shortly after the first protests started in Tunisia in December 2010, the European Union released a first proposal in response to the Arab Uprisings. The new approach put democratization back on the agenda of EU Mediterranean policy (Tömmel 2013: 24-25). In March 2011, right after the fall of the regime of Husni Mubarak in Egypt, the European Union launched a communication titled “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” (Tömmel 2013: 25), which was followed by a second paper in May 2011 entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy” (Tömmel 2013: 27). The idea of these papers was to demand economic and political reforms to further obtain support from the European Union – summarized as “money, mobility, and market access” (Bicchi 2014: 323).

According to Tömmel (2013: 27), the new approaches were simply a reformulation of the whole EU Southern Neighbourhood policy of the European Union. Most importantly, mobility partnerships stayed on the agenda of the
EU’s Southern Neighbourhood Policy in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Therefore, Asseburg (2013: 56) notes that EU’s policies were “readjusted” after the Arab Uprisings but not fundamentally revised.

Right after the Arab Uprisings the European Union started to negotiate a mobility partnership with Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco was the first Mediterranean country to sign the agreement with the European Union in June 2013 (Seeberg 2014a: 2). As the European Council states in the official agreement, the mobility partnership is based on GAMM and focuses on legal migration of Moroccans residing in the European Union and of third country nationals legally staying in Morocco (Seeberg 2014a: 2-3).

The cooperation between the European Union and Tunisia started already in 1969 with a cooperation agreement that was entirely trade-based. In 1995, Tunisia signed an association agreement with the European Union that was implemented in 1998. One year after the fall of the regime of Ben Ali, the European Union agreed on a privileged partnership with Tunisia in order to support the economic and democratic development of the country (Dandashly 2014: 8-9). In March 2014, more than three years after the protests had started in the Tunisian hinterland, Tunisia became the second Middle Eastern country to sign a mobility partnership with the European Union (Seeberg 2014a: 2).

Seeberg (2014b: 2) claims that the mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia are the “result of economic and political pressure from the EU.” Meanwhile, mobility partnerships have consistently been criticized for their focus on temporary mobility over permanent forms of migration (Lusenti & Watanabe 2014: 4). In addition, mobility is conditionally depending on the willingness of the EU member states (Lusenti & Watanabe 2014: 4). Even more so, the real virtue of these partnerships still depends on the willingness of the elites in the southern countries (Dandashly 2014: 7). Thus, Asseburg (2013: 58) and Carrera et al. (2012: 15) doubt that these mobility partnerships can be understood as equal partnerships that cover Arab countries’ interests as well as EU security interests. Whereas the partner country has to pass on information to FRONTEX in order to prevent irregular migration and to strengthen border control (Angenendt 2014: 5), the obligations for EU member states concern four areas: 1. legal migration which includes prioritizing workers from the EU member states, 2. the area of migration management in partner countries in order to reduce costs of remittances, 3. preventing brain drain, 4. visa facilitations (Angenendt 2014: 6). However, for many observers it seems obvious that the agreements focus on externalization of migration policy, strengthening border control, as well as readmission agreements (see for example, Carrera et al. 2013; Geddes 2014: 153; Seeberg 2014b: 3). According to Carrera et al. (2012: 16), mobility partnerships seem to be a fait accompli for the Mediterranean countries because they need to fulfil the EU-security requirements in order to obtain at least limited access to “Fortress Europe.”
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In order to give an answer to the research question, a distinction between the notions of danger and risk with regard to migration has to be established. According to Geddes (2014: 155), the notions of danger and risk can best be analyzed when looking at the development of EU’s migration policy in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. On the one hand, Geddes (2014: 139) analyzes migration as “danger to be guarded” and on the other hand as “risk to be managed.” Both understandings of migration correspond to one of the theories presented in chapter 2. Whereas “danger” can also be translated as “threat” in terms of the Copenhagen School, “risk” belongs to the vocabulary of the Paris School. Geddes (2014: 156) argues that the understanding of migration as a risk demands a dialogue about the consequences of migration and further partnerships between the European Union and its neighboring countries. In contrast, the understanding of migration as a threat requires “extraordinary measures” as part of a security-driven approach to migration that have to be implemented without long lasting negotiations between the European Union and its partner countries (Geddes 2014: 156).

The most important effects of the events in 2011 are the strengthening of external border controls and the increasing cooperation with third countries. However, negotiations between Tunisia and the European Union started long before 2011 and lasted until the implementation of the agreement on mobility in 2014. Thus, this mobility partnership was not implemented just after the first turmoil, but more than three years after the fall of Ben Ali. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as “extraordinary measure.” Moreover, the case of Egypt, where state officials refused to enter into negotiations with the EU in the early phase of the transition in 2011 and 2012, shows that extraordinary measures cannot be implemented as easy as the Copenhagen School claims (Asseburg 2013: 57). Instead, a consensus between all member states is required for the implementation of new policy tools in the context of migration and if there is no will of the partner countries to agree on further contracts, no agreements on mobility can be reached (Asseburg 2013: 57). This is in clear contrast to the assumptions of the Copenhagen School. Therefore, mobility partnerships depend on long negotiations between the EU member states and their southern partners. Furthermore, the concept of mobility partnerships with neighboring countries was introduced by the European Union in 2006 in the context of GAM (Carrera et al. 2012: 13). In 2007, they were presented as “the most innovative and sophisticated tool” by the European Commission (Angenendt 2014: 4). This means that the concept was developed as a new political tool more than four years before the Arab Uprisings. Additionally, the revision of the European migration policy did not start in reaction to the events in 2011 but long before (Asseburg 2013: 57). Thus, the idea of mobility partnerships was not the result of the Arab Uprisings. In contrast, they were implemented with other neighboring countries in West-
ern Africa (Cap Verde) and Eastern countries like Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, too (Angenendt 2014: 4).

However, in November 2011, mobility partnerships became the main instrument of the renewed version of the Global Approach to Migration, entitled GAMM (Carrera et al. 2012: 3). According to Angenendt (2014: 5), the main driving forces behind GAMM were a shift in size and structure of migration, a changing public debate, and the deadlock in cooperation with origin and transit countries. Thus, mobility partnerships were seen as important response to current “migration trends” (Angenendt 2014: 5). Therefore, they can be valued as outcome of the management of unease which would have been implemented with or without Arab uprisings. Indeed, European countries should be increasingly interested in implementing further mobility partnerships because of the current political challenges and institutional settings of the European Union (Angenendt 2014: 5). The fact that these mobility partnerships address, first and foremost, the interests of the European Union becomes apparent when looking at the major points of the agreements. They mainly focus on preventing illegal migration and improving border controls which are common policy trends that do not need extraordinary measures but normal policy tools. The most important feature of the mobility partnerships are readmission agreements (e.g. Geddes 2014: 153).

Furthermore, the mobility partnerships are part of a holistic strategic approach to manage the movement of people between the European Union and its southern neighboring countries (Geddes 2014: 154) and should not be associated solely with the Arab Uprisings.

“Therefore, if the changes [in the European policy towards the Mediterranean countries] observed in Tunisia have possibly been induced by the Arab uprisings, they are nonetheless completely in continuity with the previous practices of the EU delegation in Tunis. The Arab uprisings therefore constituted a contextual change resulting in minor adjustment of the EU’s democracy promotion in the region, but not challenging in any way the determinants of practices which are profoundly rooted in the institutional identities of the EU actors involved.” (Mouhib 2014: 352)

As mentioned before, mobility partnerships can be understood as part of the normal political process that included the implementation of FRONTEX as well. As part of the agreement on mobility, the partner countries in the Middle East have to collect information on irregular migration and strengthen their border controls in close cooperation with FRONTEX (Angenendt 2014: 5). It becomes apparent that mobility partnerships and the European Border Agency FRONTEX are two political tools of the current migration policy of the European Union. Therefore, one can conclude that mobility partnerships are the outcome of a political process to further cooperation with third countries in order to strengthen border controls and to prevent (ir)regular migration to the European Union. This does not mean that the speech act has not been a
securitizing move after the protests had started in 2011. After the first turmoil, the media and some European politicians created a link between migration flows coming to Europe and the problem of security in the European discourse; even though the increase in international migration had already started before the Arab Uprisings and there was no proof of a causal relation between increasing migration and the events in 2011.\(^5\) Instead of focusing on the speech act and the process of securitization, we should rather look at the role of security professionals as suggested by the Paris School.

Security professionals, such as the industry, politicians and foreign elites are interested in implementing further agreements with third countries because they are responsible for risk management. For example, Geddes remarks that mobility partnerships are the result of the Arab Uprising insofar as they show how the European Union tries to deal with the risk of migration (2014: 141). The aim of this policy tool is to engage politically and to manage the citizens’ (im)mobility in the southern neighboring countries. Geddes (2014: 141) describes this practice as “immobility first” because it mainly focuses on improving border controls and thus regulating migration from the Middle East. Furthermore, he criticizes that the European Union seems exclusively interested in high-skilled workers: “Migrants tend to be valued on the basis of their putative economic contribution” (Geddes 2014: 144). Except the higher-skilled workers, people coming to Europe are generally perceived as a danger to the European labor market and the welfare system (Geddes 2014: 144).

In sum, the Arab Uprisings may have accelerated the establishment of the mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia as well as the fact that the European Union has resumed negotiations with other Middle Eastern countries (Angenendt 2014: 7). However, “security policy is never compelled by external events” (Walker 2004:11, quoted by Geddes 2014: 145). Geddes (2014: 156) summarizes that the “distinction between danger and risk should not be seen as a simple dichotomy.” Instead, for the European Union migration is not “either a danger or risk; it is both of these things at the same time” and this “inter-relationship between notions of risk and of danger that underpins the development and consolidation of Europe’s international migration and that has been evident in EU relations with MENA partner countries” is most important (Geddes 2014: 156). Nevertheless, the mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia were the result of an ordinary political process. Regardless of the Arab Uprisings, these partnerships would have been signed because of their importance as political instruments to prevent (ir)regular migration and to control external borders (Carrera et al. 2012:)

\(^5\) It would be necessary to analyze the speech act of different European politicians in order to give a profound answer to the question if there was a securitizing move after the Arab Uprisings. However, this is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, I am going to analyze the European discourse regarding the link between migration and security. If necessary, this has to be done in a future work.
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13). The empirics that I presented give evidence for my second hypothesis which I derived from the theoretical assumptions of the Paris School: If the EU mobility partnerships result from risk management in a society of unease, this targets the strengthening of the existing territorial boundaries of the EU. It would not go far enough to explain the mobility partnerships as result of successful securitization in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, as formulated in my first hypothesis.

Conclusion

In political science and particularly in International Security Studies, political tools such as mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries have often been explained as the results of successful securitization. However, taking into account the implementation process and the history of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration, I argued that the Euro-Mediterranean mobility partnerships established with Morocco and Tunisia in 2013 and 2014 cannot be understood as extraordinary measures in terms of the Copenhagen School. The concept of mobility partnerships was introduced to European migration policy in 2006. They were understood as the most effective new tool in preventing (ir)regular migration and strengthening external border controls in the context of increasing migration to Europe. This means that migration was interpreted as a risk to European societies and welfare systems. This risk needed to be managed by security professionals who are responsible for the “security management” of the European Union. Thus, mobility partnerships belong to the ordinary EU policy-making process in terms of the Paris School.

Taking a closer look at the implementation process, securitization theory cannot be used to fully explain the final implementation of mobility partnerships. Long lasting negotiations were part of the ordinary political process. Without the agreement of all EU member states as well as the respective partner state, the European Union would not have been able to implement these mobility partnerships. Therefore, I conclude that the Copenhagen School’s approach of securitization and extraordinary measures fails to explain the political outcome after the Arab Uprisings at the EU level.

Nevertheless, I agree with Geddes (2014) that risks cannot be distinguished from threat as easily as some scholars do. However, even an existing securitizing move that links migration to security does not imply successful securitization in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. The reason why some European politicians tried to classify migration from the Middle East as a threat to the European societies was to legitimate extraordinary measures in terms of the Copenhagen School that would not have been implemented otherwise. Looking at the EU migration policy in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings shows that European politicians did not have to legitimate the mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia. In this case,
legitimacy from the European society as the audience, which needs to be convinced according to the Copenhagen School’s approach, was not important but rather the negotiation about mutual cooperation with the southern partner countries.

The Arab Uprisings potentially influenced the ongoing negotiations insofar as the European Union was even more interested in strengthening external borders because of the political changes in the Middle East. However, the implementation of mobility partnerships was not the result of securitization, but based on successful negotiations as well as economic and political pressure on the Middle Eastern countries as Seeberg (2014b: 2) states.

Based on these findings, further research seems to be necessary in order to draw conclusions on the policy-making process in the EU. One option would be to analyze the negotiation process as well as the content of the mobility partnerships in more detail to find out about potential content changes after the Arab uprisings. It would be interesting to ask, if other points were added or formulated differently after the Arab uprisings. In order to do so, previous drafts of the partnerships must be compared with the final agreements between the EU and the North African countries. Yet, this study gives a first hint to the complex structure of power relations underlying a transnational network of security professionals which act on EU policy-making processes.
“I reflect”

The article is based on a seminar paper which I handed in at the Department of Political Science at the University of Tübingen. The seminar focused on securitization theory and the current EU migration policy. In class, we discussed the Copenhagen and Paris Schools and their potential to explain the EU’s policy approach towards migration. At the end of the semester, I still struggled with myself taking position for one of the theories. During my MA studies, I did research on North Africa and, in particular, on Tunisia. Therefore, I was relatively familiar with the research literature criticizing the Mobility Partnerships between the EU and its Mediterranean neighboring countries as one-sided. Against the background of this literature, I became curious if the EU Mobility Partnerships with Tunisia and Morocco could be either explained as the policy outcome of securitization after the Arab uprisings or if they have been long-standing projects from which various actors, e.g. “security professionals”, profit.

In my article, I tried to show that tools of the EU’s current migration policy, such as the EU-Mediterranean Mobility Partnerships, do not represent “extraordinary measures” in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, but have been planned, negotiated and revised for years. The Arab uprisings, thus, may have strengthened the EU’s political line. However, the Mobility Partnerships were based on successful negotiations as well as political and economic pressure on the two North African countries. Therefore, they must be seen as the result of the normal policy-making process.
References


Jöst: Securitization or Risk Management?


